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From Correlation to Gestalt. Cohen’s and Rosenzweig’s 
Foundations of Dialogue Philosophy
AbstrAct: A search for the foundations of the philosophy of dialogue turns the 
researchers to Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig. The two philosophers did 
not consider their theory as specifically dialogue-oriented, but they both contributed 
greatly to the development of the philosophy of dialogue. It is important that 
Rosenzweig is Cohen’s successor, so that their ideas give a good illustration of the 
new philosophy’s appearance and development. The purpose of this article includes 
the study of the contribution of Cohen to the philosophy of dialogue; the analysis 
of Rosenzweig’s concept and its comparison with Cohen’s philosophy; elucidation 
of the continuity of the two philosophers and the further development of the 
philosophy of dialogue in connection with the concepts of Cohen and Rosenzweig.
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1. Hermann Cohen as a source of the philosophy of dialogue
In Europe, the philosophy of dialogue is typically associated with Martin Buber, 
Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, which connects it to existentialism and its rep-
resentatives such as Bernhard Casper, Shmuel Hugo Bergman, Ze’ev Levy etc.1.
In Russia, there is more comprehensive understanding which connects the 
philosophy of dialogue with the teachings of Hermann Cohen2. There are several 
reasons for this. Indeed, Cohen is a common starting point of the philosophy of 
dialogue shared not only by Buber and Rosenzweig, but also by Mikhail Bakhtin, the 
1 The connection between the philosophy of dialogue and existentialism was first addressed 
in the 1960s, when existentialism enjoyed high popularity. See B. Casper, Das dialogische Denken. 
Eine Untersuchung der religionsphilosophischen Bedeutung Franz Rosenzweigs, Ferdinand Ebners 
und Martin Bubers, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, Herder, 1967; S. H. Bergman, Dialogical Philosophy 
from Kierkegaard to Buber (1974), Engl. transl. by A. A. Gerstein, foreword by N. Rotenstreich, 
Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 1991; Z. Levy, Mevaser ekzistentsializm ye-
hudi. Mishnato shel Franz Rosenzweig ve-ye
˙
hasa le-shitat Hegel [A Precursor of Jewish Existen-
tialism. The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig and Its Relation to Hegel’s System], Tel Aviv, Sifriat 
Poalim, 1969; Z. Levy, Franz Rosenzweig’s relationship to Hegel’s philosophy, paper submitted to 
the English section of the Kor ̌c  ula Summer School, August 19th-26th, 1970.
2 Cf. V. N. Belov, Yavlyaetsya li German Kogen neokantiantsem? [Is Hermann Cohen a Neo-
Kantian?], in “Kantovskiy sbornik”, 2015, n. 3 (53), p. 42.
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most important dialogue philosopher in Russia. Many studies of Bakhtin connect 
his philosophical ideas with the dialogic concepts of Buber and Rosenzweig3 and the 
one and only link to him in the philosophy of dialogue is through the teachings of 
Cohen4.
Moreover, Russian researchers associate the philosophy of dialogue with the 
logic of dialogue linked to logico-epistemological and psychological issues5. Thus, 
the philosophy of dialogue is not limited to continental philosophy, as it is also 
connected to analytic philosophy6.
Against this background, the relations between Cohen’s and Rosenzweig’s con-
cepts acquire much importance. The two philosophers did not consider them-
selves the creators of the philosophy of dialogue, but both made substantial con-
tributions to it. The relation between Cohen’s and Rosenzweig’s concepts not only 
provides a better understanding of Rosenzweig’s philosophy, but also helps to 
uncover the genesis of the philosophy of dialogue. However, neither Cohen nor 
Rosenzweig described their philosophy as solely the philosophy of dialogue, even 
though they both contributed greatly to its development. Cohen and Rosenzweig 
built their concepts before the dispute in Davos that split Neo-Kantianism, phe-
nomenology and analytical philosophy, and they hoped that philosophy returns to 
its original unity7.
2. General formulation of the philosophy of dialogue
Since we describe the relation between Cohen’s and Rosenzweig’s concepts, we 
formulate off the philosophy of dialogue as it may be understood at the moment.
3 Cf. M.  M. Bakhtin, Sobranie sochineniy [Collected Works], vol.  1, Filosofskaya estetika 
1920-kh godov [Aesthetic Philosophy of the 1920s], ed. by S. G. Bocharov and N. I. Nikolaev, 
Moscow, Russkie slovari, 2003; V. S. Bibler, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, ili poetika kul’tury 
[Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, or the Poetics of Culture], Moscow, Progress-Gnosis, 1991; 
M. M. Bakhtin, Besedy s V. D. Duvakinym [Conversations with V. D. Duvakin] (1993-1994), ed. 
by S. G. Bocharov, V. Radzishevskii et al., Moscow, Soglasie, 2002; V. L. Machlin, Ya i Drugoy. 
K istorii dialogicheskogo printsipa v filosofii XX v [I and Other. On the History of Dialogical Prin-
ciple in the 20th-Century Philosophy], Moscow, Labirint, 1997.
4 The mediator between Bakhtin and the Neo-Kantians was Cohen’s own disciple, Matvei 
Kagan, who was deported from Berlin to Nevel in 1918 and later became Bakhtin’s close friend 
and companion in philosophical studies. See M. I. Kagan, O khode istorii [On the Course of His-
tory], ed. by V. I. Makhlin, Moscow, Yazyki slavyanskoy kul’tury, 2004; I. S. Dvorkin, Kontury 
filosofii istorii Matveya Kagana [Outlines of Matvei Kagan’s Philosophy of History], in “Filosofiya 
sotsial’nykh kommunikatsiy”, 2010, n. 1 (10), pp. 87-95.
5 Cf. V. S. Bibler, Na granyakh logiki kul’tury. Kniga izbrannykh ocherkov [On the Edges of 
the Logic of Culture. Selected Essays], Moskow, Russkoe fenomenologicheskoe obshestvo, 1997; 
G. S. Batischev, Vvedenie v dialektiku tvorchestva [Introduction to Dialectics of Creativity], Saint 
Petersburg, RKhGI, 1997.
6 Cf. R. Carnap, Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache, in “Er-
kenntnis”, II (1931), pp. 219-241.
7 Cf. I. S. Dvorkin, Analiticheskoe vvednie v filosofiyu dialoga [An Analytical Introduction 
into the Philosophy of Dialogue], in “Metafizika. Nauchnyy zhurnal”, 2016, n. 4 (22), pp. 8-27.
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The main proposition that unites various versions of the philosophy of dialogue 
is that reality is effected not within the framework of the subject-object relation. The 
relation is between persons engaged in a dialogue about some entity. As a rule, the 
descriptions of this relation include the three persons of the singular: I, Thou and 
He/She (It). Some researchers, like those of Cohen and Rosenzweig, add the first-
person plural (We) to indicate the environment where the dialogue happens. Let us 
take the letters i, t, h and w to denote these persons. Now, the relations described by 
the philosophers mentioned above are: I-Thou or i→t, and I-He/She (It) or i→h. A 
third relation should be added, that of the dialogue partner to this entity, formulated 
as Thou-He/She or t→h.
In these terms, the formulation of the dialogue philosophy as we have given it 
may be written as
 
i→h = i→t (t→h).
This equation shows that the relation between the first person (I) and the third 
person (the thing) is only definite if it is identical to my perception of the thing 
mediated by the second person (Thou).
The relation i→t cannot express the intellectual relation, since i and t do not 
form subject-object relationship. It shall be regarded as a special type of relations 
that cannot be reduced to reasoning. Instead, it may be interpreted as speech or 
word relation. Indeed, most dialogue philosophers favor this approach. The main 
role of language in philosophical reasoning is also shown by the attention that 
the pronoun We receives in the concepts of philosophers, principally Cohen and 
Rosenzweig. These two philosophers do not reduce the We to a communal sub-
jectivity, as it appears in Marxist approach. Cohen and Rosenzweig describe We 
as a common space where dialogue can develop. When the first person singular (i) 
enters the dialogue, it finds this dialogue enclosed by the first-person plural (w). 
Their relations may be described by the logical formula ih = iw (wh).
Let us look how these ideas are reflected in Cohen’s and Rosenzweig’s concepts 
in detail.
3. Hermann Cohen’s contribution to the philosophy of dialogue
According to our opinion, among the founders of the philosophy of dialogue, 
Cohen’s teaching is the most fundamental. Profound research is required to de-
termine all connections between Cohen’s thought and dialogism, but for now we 
study only several salient propositions8.
8 See Z. A. Sokuler, German Kogen i filosofiya dialoga [Hermann Cohen and the Philosophy of 
Dialogue], Moscow, Progress-Traditsiya, 2008; I. S. Dvorkin, Fylosofyya dialoha v poyskakh puty 
[Philosophy of Dialogue in Search of a Way], in Filosofs’ki dialohy 2013. Tolerantnist’ ta dialoh 
v suchasnomu sviti [Philosophical Dialogues 2013. Tolerance and Dialogue in Modern World], 
Kiev, Instytut filosofiyi imeni G. S. Skovorody, Natsional’na Akademiya Nauk Ukraïny, 2013, 
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Cohen’s logic of the origin (Ursprung) considers even actual being (Dasein) 
as well as thinking to be processes. It emphasizes temporality, a significant 
precondition for the philosophy of dialogue. Cohen does not merely suggest that 
thinking and being unfold in time, which Hegel already stated. Cohen’s position in 
relation to processuality of the world is much more radical. A process that reaches 
its logical completion cannot be called a process and becomes only a trace of the 
past. For Cohen, actual being belongs to the present. One illustration of this idea 
is the following Cohen’s description of plurality and unity9.
Cohen stresses that plurality (Mehrheit) should stay plural, but at the same time 
it should also be considered as divided unity (Einheit). How do these two defini-
tions work together? According to Cohen, they can only be related in time. In the 
present actuality (Gegenwart), they can be thought as processes that have not yet 
been completed.
So, if differentiation can never be considered completed, it remains a unification. It 
preserves the unification in itself. And if a unification can never be considered com-
pleted, it remains differentiation10.
Cohen describes the present not as continuation of the past, but as rise towards 
the future. As he says, the present must become the future11.
The only way to think the plurality is to think the process of differentiation, and 
the only way to think the unity is to think the process of unification. When think-
ing acquires a processual character, it helps to understand the processual character 
of the reality itself. According to Cohen, this is not a coincidence. It is the very 
essence of the actual being. Indeed, to describe the actual reality, Cohen also uses 
the word Gegenwart that in German means both the “present time” and the “actu-
ally existing”.
Even thinking, for Cohen, is thinking the origin of a process12. The origin is the 
beginning, the foundation, the principle. In a way, as with Hegel, Cohen’s origin 
or beginning is Nothing. But differing from Hegel, Cohen does not postulate the 
absolute Nothing as the beginning. For him, the origin is an infinitesimally small 
value, a differential. This notion comes from Leibniz, whose concepts Cohen here 
unites with those of Kant. Cohen suggests to consider the reality in its origin. A 
pp. 112-171; I. S. Dvorkin, Astrolyabiya. Putevoditel’ po filosofii “Zvezdy izbavleniya” Frantza 
Rozentsveyga [Astrolabe. Guide to the Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption], in 
F. Rozentsveyg, Zvezda izbavleniya [The Star of Redemption], Russ. transl. by I. S. Dvorkin and 
E. Yanduganova, ed. by I. S. Dvorkin, Jerusalem-Moscow, Gesharim, 2017, pp. 469-512.
9 Cf. H. Cohen, System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1902, 
19142), in idem, Werke, ed. by Hermann-Cohen-Archiv at the Department of Philosophy of 
the University of Zurich under the direction of H. Holzhey, vol. 6, introduction by H. Holzhey, 
Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms, 1977, pp. 62-67.
10 Ibidem, p. 64: “Die Sonderung, die niemals als abgeschlossen gedacht werden darf, bleibt 
somit Vereinigung. Die Vereinigung erhält sich in ihr. Und die Vereinigung, die nicht abge-
schlossen gedacht werden darf, erhält sich dadurch als Sonderung”.
11 See ibidem, p. 63: “Die Gegenwart muß indessen zur Zukunft werden”.
12 Cf. ibidem, pp. 140 and 35 f.
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thing-in-itself is unthinkable, as thinking cannot be identical to a thing. However, 
the process of thinking can be correlated with a thing as considered in its origin. 
Instead of Hegel’s dialectic that postulates the identity of thinking and being, Co-
hen proposes a dialectic that regards the process of thinking as the process of cor-
relation with the origin13.
This view of thinking as a process of correlation is Cohen’s great contribution to the 
philosophy of dialogue. Indeed, the philosophy of dialogue aims to understand reality 
as a process that is happening in the present time. However, to be sure that Cohen 
here means dialogue and not just thinking, we have to follow him further. The second 
important step is to understand that Cohen describes an interpersonal process. This 
approach opens up the domain of inter-human relations, the sphere of ethics.
In his Ethik des reinen Willens (Ethic of the Pure Will), Cohen gives a new answer 
to the old question first asked by Fichte and that later on became the foundation 
of classical German idealism. Fichte formulates it as the question of the relation 
between I and Not-I. The Not-I, for Fichte, is the world which faces the human. 
Thus, the question may be reformulated so that it refers to the relation between the 
subject and the object, which is the central theme of European philosophy.
Cohen’s definition of Not-I is radically different from Fichte. Cohen explains that 
the world or the objective reality cannot be a real alternative to the human. Since 
the world may be defined as It, it is not comparable to I. The main feature of I is the 
personal will, which It does not possess. Accordingly, the alternative to I is not the 
world. The human faces another human. Thus, the real alternative to I is Thou.
An individual person does not really possess self-consciousness […]. But I shall ex-
perience the otherness in order to become self-conscious […]. Thou is not the same 
as He. He would mean the Other, who is in danger to be treated like He as well. But 
of all things, Thou and I belong together. I cannot say Thou without relating Thou 
to me; without uniting Thou with me in this relation. But then at once, there is the 
requirement: I, for my part, cannot conceive I without thinking of Thou. Thus, in 
self-consciousness, the Other [person] immediately forms the dual form of I14.
Fundamentality of interpersonal relations, put in the first place the problem 
of language and hermeneutics, is the common characteristic of all philosopher of 
dialogue.
13 See J. Gordon, Der Ichbegriff bei Hegel, bei Cohen und in der Südwestdeutschen Schule 
hinsichtlich der Kategorienlehre untersucht, part 1, Der Begriff des Denkens bei Hegel und Cohen, 
Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1927.
14 H. Cohen, System der Philosophie. Zweiter Teil. Ethik des reinen Willens (1904, 19072), in 
idem, Werke, cit., vol. 7, introduction by P. A. Schmid, Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, Georg 
Olms, 2002, pp. 248 f.: “das physische Einzelwesen kein echtes Selbstbewusstsein besitzt […]. 
Aber die Anderung musste das Ich doch erleiden, um Selbstbewusstsein zu werden […]. Du ist 
nicht Er. Es wäre der Andere. Er kommt in Gefahr, auch als Er behandelt zu werden. Du und Ich 
gehören schlechterdings zusammen. Ich kann nicht Du sagen, ohne dich auf mich zu beziehen; 
ohne dich in dieser Beziehung mit dem ich zu vereinigen. Aber es liegt darin zugleich die gestei-
gerte Forderung: dass ich auch nicht Ich denken kann, ohne dich zu denken. So hat der Anderer 
im Selbstbewusstsein sich gleichsam in den Dualis des Ich verwandelt”.
102 ilya dvorkin      Filosofia
4. Franz Rosenzweig’s reception of the logic of the origin
Rosenzweig intentionally draws upon Cohen, and even more consciously he ar-
gues with his teacher when he advances of his own philosophy.
Rosenzweig borrows Cohen’s logic of the origin, but he also modifies it to 
large extent. For Rosenzweig, the reality is completed on the level of elements, 
but on the level of paths it is understood as open, actually existing here and 
now. However, for this representation the concept of correlation is not enough. 
According to some researchers Rosenzweig debates with his teacher this point15. 
The theory of correlations seems too static, and Rosenzweig replaces it with a 
dynamic theory of the Gestalt (“figure”, “configuration”). Here, the elements 
are linked not simply by connections – but rather by process, meaning the 
“path” (Bahn)16.
What is the main difference between Gestalt and correlation? The correla-
tion connects the transcendent origin to the process happening here and now. It 
opens access to the temporality of the present. However, it is a very simple con-
nection that is insufficient to describe real processes. This functional approach 
can only facilitate the understanding of a completed process. While Hegel claims 
to give a full understanding of the processual character of the being, describ-
ing it as the progress of the absolute spirit, Cohen’s logic of origin addresses 
the processual character of actual being. And Rosenzweig takes a further step. 
Within the Gestalt, two paths are dynamically related to each other. Their in-
teraction makes dynamic of Gestalt whole. This dynamic becomes something 
more than external reality. For Rosenzweig, the paths of creation and revelation 
are given, and only their interaction within Gestalt, which produces the path of 
redemption, transcends the givenness. According to Rosenzweig, idealism and 
Islam never transcend Gestalt because they do not know the difference between 
creation and revelation.
The Gestalt theory is a highly original concept in Rosenzweig’s philosophy. 
Within Gestalt, dynamic processes between God, human and world are inter-
connected. The notion of Gestalt is a development of the concept of subject-
object relations, but with processes instead of relations, and instead of two par-
ticipants (the subject and the object) there are three (human, world and God). 
Their interaction happens in all three times we know – the past, the present and 
the future. Within the dialogue, this process develops between the three persons: 
I, Thou, He/She.
15 Cf. Y. Gil’ad, ‘Iyun hashva’ati be-havanat musag hahitgalut be-hagutam shel Hermann Co-
hen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber [A Comparative Study of the Concept of Revelation in the 
Thought of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber], Haifa, Universitat Heifa, 2005, 
p. 20.
16 F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption (1921), Engl. transl. by W. W. Hallo, New York-
Chicago-San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, p. 125.
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5. Franz Rosenzweig’s reception of the interpersonal relations
Similar to Cohen, the interpersonal relation I-Thou is for Rosenzweig the 
foundation for the reality of the present. But Cohen only stresses the benefits of 
I-Thou as compared to I-It and uncovers the role of I-Thou relation in forming the 
We, whereas Rosenzweig considers all interpersonal relations in detail.
An important innovation that Rosenzweig develops is his philosophy of 
language. Importantly, it appears almost simultaneously with Cassirer’s idea 
of language as a symbolic form, which suggests Neo-Kantian sources. For 
Rosenzweig, mathematics describes the organon of thinking that works with 
existing, i.e. past continuing time. Unlike mathematics, grammar represents 
the organon of language that deals with present. Grammar works not with 
elements, but with paths. In Der Stern der Erlösung (The Star of Redemption), 
Rosenzweig attempts to implement logical derivation of language. The original 
words of logic are ‘yes’ and ‘no’, while those of grammar are ‘good’ and ‘I’. 
Its root sentence expresses the concept of ‘We’17. In Rosenzweig’s theory, the 
pronouns I, Thou, He, She, It, We are transformed into systematic concepts 
of his philosophical grammar.
Another way for Rosenzweig to explain the language is to deduce linguistics 
from the structure of the biblical text which he invests with prophetic value. Fol-
lowing the Bible, Rosenzweig treads in Cohen’s footsteps, who has presented the 
foundation for a new biblical hermeneutics. Within the biblical narration, God 
and human are engaged in a dialogue, which Rosenzweig presents as the genesis of 
language. God asks the human: “Where are Thou?” (Gen 3:9)18, but it is not until 
much later that the human answers: “Here I am” (Gen 22:1.11, 31:11, Exod. 3:4)19. 
And the Divine I first appears in its aspect of judgment (Gen 6:13.17) and only at 
the time of the testament it becomes the basis for love between God and human: 
“I am the Lord thy God” (Exod. 20:2, Deut. 5:6).
For Rosenzweig, the three persons of the singular and the three persons of the 
plural are a system, not just a set of notions.
This point reveals the difference between Rosenzweig and another famous 
representative of the philosophy of dialogue: Martin Buber20. Buber contrasts 
I-Thou with I-It, while Rosenzweig treats them as a whole. Unlike Buber, for 
Rosenzweig the I-Thou relation is immediately linked to the I-It, whereas present 
time is connected to past and future. When the human addresses God as Thou, 
this is not abstracted from created world and from past time and strives towards 
redemption in future. As Rosenzweig shows in a letter to Buber, the Jewish 
prayer formula Ata hu Eloheinu (literally “Thou art He our God”) is more than 
the Buberian conception of God as the “eternal Thou”. Rosenzweig’s Gestalt 
17 Cf. ibidem, pp. 125-127.
18 Ibidem, p. 175.
19 Ibidem, p. 176.
20 See M. Buber, I and Thou (1923), Engl. transl. by R. G. Smith, with a postscript by the 
author added, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 19582.
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includes not only the dialogue with God, but also the dialogue between people. 
They are further connected with the process of revelation and directed towards 
redemption where “eternal We” is formed.
Buber, on the other side, finds eternity already in the position of second per-
son: “in each we are aware of a breath from the eternal Thou; in each Thou we ad-
dress the eternal Thou”21. Buber’s “eternal Thou” is fundamentally different from 
Rosenzweig’s “eternal We”. The latter always includes an estrangement, because 
We means not only I and Thou, but also He, She, and They. For Rosenzweig, this 
connection is necessary. For him God is the God of a community and not only 
the personal God of an individual man. This leads to certain externalization of 
God, meaning that God can be spoken of with third person pronouns. Of course, 
such talk is dangerous, but Rosenzweig does not shun it. On the contrary, Buber’s 
God cannot be expressed using third person; God is not an existing being that 
can be spoken about. Speech can only be addressed to God: “Something else is 
not ‘given’ and God then elicited from it; but God is the Being that is directly, 
most nearly, and lastingly, over against us, that may properly only be addressed, 
not expressed”22.
Buber considers that category of having, or possession in relation, because hav-
ing is linked to subject-object relations, i.e. to I-It: “But God, the eternal Presence, 
does not permit Himself to be held. Woe to the man so possessed that he thinks 
he possesses God!”23.
But Rosenzweig embraces the formula “Thou art (He) our God” which not only 
uses the third person pronoun to speak about God, but also declares that God 
belongs to the community24.
6. Analytics of interpersonal dialogue and its logico-mathematical model
We will now proceed to formulate Rosenzweig’s ideas about interpersonal dia-
logue, using our logico-mathematical formalism (cf. § 2). Rosenzweig himself sug-
gested that mathematics and logic are only valid inside the completed world of 
elements and cannot be used in unfolding in the present interpersonal relations 
that are described by organon of grammar. However, there may be proposed a 
more comprehensive understanding of logic which includes pronoun structures 
describing interpersonal relations. Enhanced with grammar, this logic of dialogue 




24 Cf. R. Horwitz, Buber’s Way to “I and Thou”. An Historical Analysis and the First Publica-
tion of Martin Buber’s Lectures “Religion als Gegenwart”, Heidelberg, Lambert Schneider, 1978, 
pp. 183-195.
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Let us use the logico-mathematical theory of categories25. If Rosenzweig’s ele-
ments are interpreted as categories and his paths as functors, then the processes 
that unfold with Gestalt can be considered as natural transformations. Then the 
above-mentioned formula i→h = i→t (t→h) describes the dialogue between i and 
t concerning the thing h.
Let us consider the most important Rosenzweig’s theses about significance 
of language in interpersonal relations. According to Rosenzweig, language joins 
creation with revelation and, thus, becomes the basis for realization of Gestalt.
The above-mentioned formula shows that the dialogue between i and t is about 
h. However, it is not h itself that is manifested in dialogue, but the transformation 
of h in the interpersonal relation i→t. Following Cohen, Rosenzweig interpreted 
this transformation as differential. It may be expressed as dhi→t. In the first part 
of The Star of Redemption Rosenzweig defines structures of this type as logico-sym-
bolic. However, in the second part of his book he investigates paths of interaction 
between the elements and analyzes language as the subject of the organon of gram-
mar. Thus, Rosenzweig brings the method where language can be investigated not 
as direct expression of reality using signs, but rather as interpersonal transforma-
tion of one’s relation to reality. Furthermore, language communication is not just 
between separate individuals, but in dialogue of the community of We that exists 
within the framework of the dialogue. The We may be expressed as following:
 
w→h, w{i,t}: (i→h = i→t (t→h)) → (t→h = t→i (i→h)).
Thus, there is double relation between i and h, i.e. the person in dialogue has 
double access to reality – direct as i and mediated through relation with t inside
 
w: i→h = i→w (w→h).
The notion We is an essential element of the theory of dialogue developed by 
Rosenzweig and Cohen.
7. Conclusions. Prospects for the philosophy of dialogue as the first philosophy
Rosenzweig calls his system the “new thinking”26 that continues and overcomes 
the evolution of philosophy “from Parmenides to Hegel”27. Rosenzweig did not 
start this philosophical movement, at least he followed Herman Cohen. Neither 
25 See R. Goldblatt, Topoi. The Categorial Analysis of Logic (Studies in Logic and the Founda- 
tions of Mathematics, vol. 94), Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, North-Holland Publishing Com-
pany, 19842.
26 F. Rosenzweig, The New Thinking. A Few Supplementary Remarks to the Star, Engl. transl. 
by A. Udoff and B. E. Galli, in Franz Rosenzweig’s “The New Thinking”, ed. by A. Udoff and 
B. E. Galli, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1999, pp. 67-102.
27 F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, cit., p. 13.
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was Rosenzweig the last dialogue philosopher: Buber, Ebner, Bakhtin and Levinas 
followed the same road. Vladimir Bibler, an outstanding Russian philosopher of 
the second half of the 20th century, may be added to this list. It is possible that, 
thanks to the efforts of these thinkers, the philosophy of dialogue will take the 
place that Rosenzweig wished for it – that of the new “first philosophy”.
